Research In Progress

Self-Esteem and Rational Self-Handicapping

Abstract: In order to protect their self-esteem, agents may create or seek out performance-inhibiting obstacles to avoid negative feedback about their ability. This behavior allows agents to attribute failures to self-imposed obstacles rather than to a lack of competence. Psychologists refer to this phenomenon as self-handicapping. In this paper, I model rational agents with preferences for self-esteem. This allows me to provide sufficient conditions under which these self-esteem concerned agents engage in rational self-handicapping behavior. I then consider the effects of self-esteem concerned agents in two policy relevant applications: education and tournaments. In education, designing an exam with noisier questions results in more studying by self-handicappers without discouraging other students. In tournaments, policies aimed at encouraging a particular group to show up to job interviews can result in strategic adjustment by the targeted group leading to their lower overall attendance.

The Abilene Paradox: The Curse of Caring Too Much (with Lia Flores and Jin Sohn)

Abstract: The Abilene Paradox (AP) is a situation in which a group of people implement an option that no one prefers. We show that a combination of social preferences and incomplete information can lead to AP in a sequential voting game. This model is tested in an online experiment. We find that the social value orientation measure is a good predictor of behaviors leading to AP. Moreover, when someone is the first to vote in the group, they are more likely to vote according to their preferences than if they are the second, third, and so on. 

Refusing to Lose: Reciprocity in Complete Information First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions

Abstract: I characterize the pure strategy equilibria in complete information, first-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders have reciprocity preferences. While the equilibria under standard preferences persist, two additional types of equilbria arise under reciprocity. There is an equilibrium with negative reciprocity in which a bidder with a low value may refuse to lose by overbidding to win the auction. There is also an equilibrium with positive reciprocity in which several bidders collude by submitting a tying bid at a low price.

Works In Progress

Video Production Value in Online Lectures: Does Higher Production Value Lead to Improved Learning Outcomes? (with Sean Alley, Steve Isbell, George Chitiyo, & Kinsey Simone)

Image Protection and Pandemic Projection (with Kathy Reed and Martin Dufwenberg)

An Experimental Approach to Rational Self-Handicapping